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Abstract 
This article tried to assess the role of media in the former Yugoslavia 
inter-ethnic conflict, the 1994 Rwanda’s genocide, and Ethiopia’s recent inter-
ethnic conflict trends comparatively. It also addresses lessons Ethiopia can 
learn from the former Yugoslavia and the 1994 Rwanda. It is mainly a 
qualitative study. For the analysis, semi-systematic literature review, frame 
analysis, and discourse analysis are used. Six ethnic-based media from 
Amhara, Oromo, and Tigre ethnic groups of Ethiopia were taken as a sample 
of the study. The finding shows that victimization frames, ethnic injustice 
frames, moral superiority frames, anti-hero frames, ‘enemy within’ frames, 
and self-defense frames are the dominant crisis frames of the media, which 
created fear, sense of a clear and present danger and mobilized violent action 
in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This article reveals that these crisis frames 
are also framed by all selected ethnic based media in current Ethiopia; to the 
extent of the potential consequence as the same result as both Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. Additionally, Yugoslavia and Rwanda media played the role of 
instigating and flaring conflict and genocide respectively. Similarly, the 
current manifestations and trends of Ethiopia’s ethnic-based media are 
following the path which Yugoslavia and Rwanda media has passed. Regional 
state/public media and specific ‘ethnic group’ based private/commercial 
Ethiopian media are abused by ‘extreme ethnic nationalists’. Based on these 
comparative analyses, the study identified major lessons from Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda which will help Ethiopia to take timely measures. Thus, structured, 
content-specific, aggressive and proactive interventions on ethnic-based 
Ethiopian media are highly needed. 
Keywords: Ethnic group, Extreme-ethnic Nationalists, Ethnic mobilization, 
Inter-ethnic Conflict, Media 
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Introduction 
Ethiopia is characterized by a large diversity of ethno-linguistics, 
cultures, religions, socio-economic activities, and governance traditions; more 
than 100 million people with more than 80 ethnic groups (Central Statistical 
Agency of FDRE, 2013; 2017). The country is one of those countries severely 
affected by violent inter-ethnic conflicts. The intensity of the conflict, its 
deadly consequence and impact on the country’s co-existence as a nation 
increases at an increasing rate for the last 29 years, after post-1991 (Bekalu, 
2017; Fekadu, 2011; Jeylan et al., 2015; Teferi, 2012; and Vaughn & Tronvoll, 
2003). For instance, Bekalu (2017) summarizes the deadly consequences of 
inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia from 1992 up to 2015; and from selected 17 
conflict incidents nearly 800 people were killed, and it also affects the country 
severely. These facts and other evidences confirmed that the country is living 
with long-lasted violent inter-ethnic conflicts. 
The conflict and its consequence have increased and became 
complicated for the last two years. For instance, in 2018/2019 (2011 Ethiopian 
calendar) because of conflicts within different ethnic groups, 1,229 people 
were killed and 1,393 were injured (FDRE Attorney General, 2019). In the 
year 2018, the country had the highest number of new internal displacements 
in the world. Around 2.9 million people were displaced because of inter-ethnic 
conflicts (Yusuf, 2019). Its severity is not only valued by the current number 
of loss of human life and material assets of the country; rather it highly affects 
the overall social, political and economic situation of the country (FDRE 
Attorney General, 2019). The long-lasting co-existence of different ethnic 
groups of the country is becoming poisoned by these conflicts (Alemayehu, 
2009; Anteneh, 2013; and Fekadu, 2011); and it threatens the co-existence of 
the country as a nation (Dagnachew, 2018; and Yusuf, 2019). 
In fact, there is no ‘ethnic conflict’ in Ethiopia; which is happening 
because of ethnic differences or ethnic antagonism; rather there is ‘inter-
ethnic’ conflict. Lubo (2012) on his sampled ten ‘inter-ethnic’ conflict cases 
concluded that, ‘none of the ethnic named conflicts were conflicts based on 
ethnic antagonism. However, they simply appeared as ethnic conflicts just 
because they happened to bear the names of participating ethnic groups’ (p. 
68). Although there are different and multi-layered causes of deadly violent 
inter-ethnic conflicts in the country; Ethnic-based political ideology and 
governance structure of the government is the dominant cause which becomes 
a base for other resource-related causes of conflict (Alemayehu, 2009; 
Anteneh, 2013; Bekalu, 2017; Van der Beken, 2010; Zerihun & Samuel, 
2019). Since ethnicity is the basic source of political power in current Ethiopia 
(Yusuf, 2019); most politicians used and politicized inter-ethnic conflicts for 
their political motives. Dagnachew (2018) called them ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’. 
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Hence, most of these inter-ethnic conflicts are triggered and amplified 
by ethnic nationalist political elites. 
Ethnic mobilization, in Ethiopia, has reached the highest level, with all 
sides mutually antagonistic and on a more or less open playing field (Yonas, 
2019; and Yusuf, 2019). The extreme ethnic nationalists who amplify the 
conflict by using the media, both mainstream and social media, are being 
observed. Although, numbers of studies have explored the triggering and 
amplifying the role of politicians in inter-ethnic conflicts of the country 
(Bekalu, 2017; Dagnachew, 2018; and Yusuf, 2019); there is no enough 
studies that address how this ethnic mobilization is done by ‘extreme ethnic 
nationalists’ by using the media. To contribute to the prevention, management, 
and transformation of violent inter-ethnic conflicts; issues framed and 
communicated by ethnic-based media needs to be sorted out. Therefore, what 
kinds of ‘crisis’ frames are framed by the media; how they framed it; and what 
are the remedial demands of interdisciplinary studies that integrate political 
communication and ethnic mobilization. 
This study compares the current negative role of ethnic-based media 
of Ethiopia with that of the former Yugoslavia and the 1994 Rwanda. The 
1994 genocide of Rwanda and the inter-ethnic conflict to the extent of 
disappearing of former Yugoslavia as a nation are the typical examples of how 
such kinds of the negative role of the media would lead a country to the worst 
scenario. Approximately 800,000 people were killed in Rwanda during 100 
days genocide in 1994; mainly orchestrated by extreme ethnic nationalists 
through media (James, 2008; Ruth, 2014; Sobel & McIntyre, 2018; and 
Thompson, 2007). Similarly, nearly 134,000 people were killed by inter-
ethnic conflicts of former Yugoslavia, from 1991 up to 2001; and then the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia as a nation becomes realized (Lyon, 2003; 
Malesic, 2013; and Oberschall, 2000). After this terrible crisis, these countries 
become historical symbols of “the result of inter-ethnic conflicts”. The ethnic-
based media of both countries are blamed to be as a major activating cause for 
the interethnic conflicts (Frohardt & Temin, 2003; Hannu-Pekka, 2009; 
Kolsto, 2009; Volčič, 2007; and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). 
Therefore, it is the right time to take lessons from Yugoslavia and the 
1994 Rwanda by conducting such kinds of interdisciplinary study; which may 
be helpful to minimize the consequences of the conflicts. Therefore the general 
objective of this study is to assess the negative role of media in the former 
Yugoslavia’s inter-ethnic conflict, the 1994 Rwanda’s genocide, and 
Ethiopia’s recent interethnic conflict trends comparatively. The study 
specifically addresses 1) to identify the dominant ‘crisis frames’ framed by the 
media during Yugoslavia and Rwanda inter-ethnic conflicts; 2) to examine 
‘crisis frames’ framed by ethnic-based media in current Ethiopia similar to 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda inter-ethnic conflicts; 3) to assess the role of media 
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in disseminating ‘crisis frames’ in inter-ethnic conflicts of Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, and Ethiopia; and 4) to identify lessons Ethiopia can learn from the 
negative role of media during Yugoslavia and Rwanda inter-ethnic conflicts. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this study is framing theory. The basic 
components, frameworks, and assumptions of the theory are taken and 
integrated into the study of media framing theory and social movement 
framing theory. To study the dominant ‘crisis frames’ which were framed by 
the selected media; the study integrates and uses general frameworks of 
mobilization frames developed by Desrosiers (2011) and media framing 
theory.  
In identity-based movements, including inter-ethnic competition, 
framing is an important vehicle; and by using framing actors of the conflict to 
mobilize their ethnic group. Ethnic mobilization, both consensus and action 
mobilization, is one of the basic tools used by actors and leaders of conflicting 
groups in inter-ethnic conflict situations. Though, oftentimes violent inter-
ethnic conflicts seem to emerge in a spontaneous situation without intentional 
organization; but in reality, these conflicts always involve a certain degree of 
planning, organizational effort and strategic deliberation (Vermeersch, 2012). 
Therefore, inter-ethnic conflicts are planned and organized conflicts organized 
by mobilizers of the conflict. ‘An ethnic conflict only occurs when a 
significant number of people have made the calculated decision to pursue their 
goals with violent means’ (Wolff, 2007, p. 6). This decision for participating 
in conflicts is the result of a long lasted political organizing effort for ethnic 
positions. And this process of political organizing, according to Vermeersch 
(2012), is ‘ethnic mobilization’. This ethnic mobilization will be successful by 
using communicative frames through the media. Different types of 
communicative frames are framed and communicated by the framers to 
mobilize the conflicting groups; first for consensuses and then for action. The 
researcher of this study argues that violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is 
provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where 
ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity. 
‘Crisis frames’ are mainly categorized as consensus mobilization and 
action mobilization frames (Desrosiers, 2011). Injustice frames and 
adversarial frames are among the dominant frames that help for consensus 
mobilization. Victimization frames and ethnic injustice frames are among the 
injustice frame types. Moral superiority frames and anti-hero frames are 
among the types of Adversarial frames. Gravity frames are the major action 
mobilization frames. ‘Enemy within’ frames are an extreme example of 
gravity frames. These entire frames frame worked by Desrosiers (2011) are 
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used to discuss and analyze the selected ethnic-based media institutions of 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. 
 
Methodology of the Study 
The study is mainly qualitative. Comprehensive literature review, 
frame analysis, and discourse analysis are used as methods of analysis. The 
comprehensive literature review is used for Yugoslavia inter-ethnic conflict 
and Rwanda genocide cases; on the other hand, frame analysis and discourse 
analysis are used for analysis concerning Ethiopia. Relevant data of dominant 
crisis frames, framed by the media during Yugoslavia inter-ethnic conflict and 
Rwanda genocide are taken from researches generated by other scholars. 
These data are collected by using a comprehensive literature review as a tool 
for data collection. 
Regarding Ethiopia, the data are sourced from media representations, 
speeches, and other articulations (‘speech acts’) communicated through 
mainstream media; basically through television. Therefore, media news and 
programs related to the current inter-ethnic relations of the country, political 
leaders’ speeches, and political activist-produced speech acts are sources of 
the data. The selected data are delimited after the coming of Prime Minister 
Abiy Ahmed (March 2018 – February 2020); because the severity and 
consequence of the conflict are escalated within these two consequent years 
(FDRE Attorney General, 2019; Yonas, 2019; and Yusuf, 2019). All the 
relevant data related to Ethiopia media were purposively sampled from 
Oromo, Amhara, and Tigre ethnic groups; because most of the ‘extreme ethnic 
nationalist’ political movements of the country are taking place from these 
ethnic groups.  
 
Data Analysis and Discussion of the Study 
Instigating and Flaring Role of Media in Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
Different research findings agreed that the media has a significant 
impact on the outbreak and widening of the conflict in both countries; with a 
slight difference in the level of the impact. Messages transmitted by broadcast 
media of Rwanda openly call for Hutu to murder Tutsis; hence the media were 
playing their role in the massacre (Des Forges, 1999; Kirschke, 1996; and 
Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). With a similar tone, Pejic (1998) discusses that the 
war in the former Yugoslavia started 10 years ago - within the media. Local 
radio and print media of Yugoslavia were used as a tool of hate, encouraging 
neighbors to turn against each other (Hannu-Pekka, 2009).  
Almost 1/3 of the violence by militias (including other armed groups) in the 
Rwanda genocide was attributed to RTLM (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). During 
Yugoslavia's 1990’s conflict official Serbian propaganda reached more than 
3.5 million people every night by using Serbia media, and that was even more 
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effective because the public did not have alternative sources for information 
(Hannu-Pekka, 2009). In a similar finding, all respondents of Ruth (2014) said 
that the media had a direct role in the Rwanda genocide; and media experts 
also say that the role of RTLM was not limited by triggering the genocide but 
also by locating the militias to places where Tutsis were hiding. For example, 
the names of people she claimed as leaders of the RPF were listed by RTLM 
journalist called Valerie Bemeriki (Ruth, 2014).  
James (2008) argues that the role of hate media in the Rwanda 
genocide should not be exaggerated; while it is commonly believed that hate 
media was a major cause of the genocide in Rwanda, instead it was a part of a 
larger social process. On the contrary, Frohardt and Temin (2003) argue that, 
although there was no strong evidence provided the direct impact of the media, 
but in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda conflict cases the media were at least 
partially successful to trigger and widening the conflicts by transmitting 
‘imminent’ threats from the conflicting groups. Similarly, Lyon (2003) and 
Oberschall (2000) express the role of the media during the Yugoslavia conflict 
as; the media started the war of words and symbols before the war of bullets. 
Generally, the ‘hate’ media had a significant role in triggering and widening 
conflicts and to the extent of genocide in both Rwanda and Yugoslavia cases. 
 
Media’s Fear Creating Injustice and Adversarial Frames  
In Rwanda, before the genocide was started, Hutu ethnic nationalists, 
through their media, were employing different victimization frames; mostly 
framed as a long-standing and targeted social, economic, and political 
discrimination by the then governor of Rwanda. At that time the Hutus’ 
claimed that the country was led by Tutsi ethnic groups. Uvin (1997) states 
that the Hutu nationalists were blamed as: they were politically and 
economically oppressed by Tutsi’s before independence from Belgium 
colonization. Rwandans were myth dependent societies; as a result myths and 
fabricated stories were used by the media as a communications crisis frame to 
intensify the genocide (James, 2008). Because of this deeply rooted myth 
communicated by the media, many Rwandans believed in the inherent 
animosity between Hutu and Tutsi groups. 
The dominant deep-rooted victimization frame, framed by Hutu 
nationalist media was ‘Tutsis are the settlers’. They express this frame in 
different perspectives as ‘foreigners’ and ‘cattle rearers’ who gradually 
managed to install a system of centuries of oppression and exploitation (James, 
2008; Lambourne, 2019; and Uvin, 1997). They framed ‘Rwanda belongs to 
the Hutu, its original inhabitants’, who had been cruelly conquered for 
centuries by the foreign masters of the Tutsi (Ruth, 2014; and Sobel & 
McIntyre, 2018). Different researchers agreed on the oppression of Hutu by 
Tutsi (Frohardt & Temin, 2003; Thompson, 2007; and Yanagizawa-Drott, 
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2014), but there is a difficulty in finding accurately recorded historical pieces 
of evidence. Due to this, ethnic-based media of Hutu used such a gap as an 
opportunity to mobilize their ethnic group by manipulating and exaggerating 
the historical relations of Hutu and Tutsi (Chrétien, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; 
and Prunier, 1995). In this regard, Taylor (1999) asserts that the selective use 
of historiography leads to build consensus on the ideology of Hutu ethnic 
extremism. After all, no Rwandan alive has the first-hand experience with the 
‘pure’ Tutsi rule, before the arrival of the colonizer. But this racist prejudice 
based media frame becomes historical and social roots and gets widespread 
acceptance (Lambourne, 2019; and Uvin, 1997). In general, this media frame 
helped them further to create notions of ‘otherness’ that made dehumanization 
of Tutsi more possible. 
Even after the independence of the country, Hutu Ethnic nationalist 
media tried to frame another communicative frame perspective; ethnic 
injustice frames. Though the political system of the country is inverted and 
large numbers of Hutu elite are on top political positions; RTLM framed that 
‘the former powerful Tutsi groups were still powerful by holding key 
economic and military positions in the country’ (de Heusch, 1994; and Uvin, 
1997). The main aim of the media continuously rewinding the previous power 
dominance of Tutsi, while Hutu’s are in power dominance, was to frame that: 
‘It is our turn! We have to keep and vanguard our power’.  
Most of the media ethnic injustice and victimization frames that create 
fear were framed based on stereotypical stories. The media frame the former 
regime as ‘feudal’ and unrepresentative and stereotypically framed the current 
Tutsi people as ‘feudal clique’ (Sobel & McIntyre, 2018). Likewise, 
stereotypical frames aimed to dehumanize the other group, during Yugoslavia 
1990’s conflict, were done by the media. For instance, Serbian television and 
radio's repetitive use of pejorative descriptions quickly became part of 
common usage (Hannu-Pekka, 2009). On the contrary, Serbia and the Serbs 
in Montenegro were stereotypically framed by other media; and this frame was 
continuously produced and transmitted (Kolsto, 2009). 
Fear creating frames much like grievances, enemy images, and 
polarized perceptions were framed in both countries for the sake of 
consensuses mobilization. This was done both in Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
cases. According to Frohardt and Temin (2003), before the outbreak of gets to 
the highest stage of violent conflict, genocide, in Rwanda, the media tried to 
create fear on Hutus by transmitting the information with content that shows 
the irreversible upcoming attack by a Tutsi militia. The same thing also 
happened in Yugoslavia. Milosevic used Serbian state media to create an 
atmosphere of fear and hatred among Serbs by spreading ‘exaggerated and 
false messages of ethnically-based attacks by Bosnian Muslims and Croats 
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against Serb people’; in doing so ethnic cleansing of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina was done (Frohardt & Temin, 2003 and Hannu-Pekka, 2009). 
Kangura, a weekly newspaper in Rwanda, instructed the Hutus by dictating 
‘Ten Commandments of the Hutu’ to have no dealings with Tutsi saying, 
‘They were and are enemies’ (Ruth, 2014). This ‘enemy’ frame of the media 
was intended to justify the attacking of neighboring Tutsi.  
While it might be difficult to attack a neighbor with whom one has 
shared good relations for some time, once that neighbor is 
‘depersonalized’ and the positive individual history is replaced by the 
negative group history, the attack is no longer against an individual but 
against what he or she represents (Frohardt & Temin. 2003, p.6).  
 
Similarly, the enmities and hatreds frames, framed by Yugoslavia 
media fuelled by fear turned neighbor against neighbor, and district against 
district, in an expanding spiral of aggression and reprisals (Oberschall, 2000). 
Equally, the mainstream media (television and printed media) were abused 
and framed intolerance, fear, and instigate animosity to create the feeling of 
threat among Yugoslav nations (Kolsto, 2009; Lyon, 2003; and Malesic, 
2013). 
The typical indicator of false reporting to associate with historical 
myths was the case of RTLM reporting about the assassination of the Burundi 
president. In reality, as stated by Thompson (2007), the Burundi president 
(from the Hutu ethnic group) was killed by a knife blow to the chest. But 
RTLM reported the assassination of the president with details of supposed 
torture, including castration of the victim.  
In pre-colonial times, some Tutsi kings castrated defeated enemy rulers 
and decorated their royal drums with the genitalia. The false report of 
the castration of the Burundi president was intended to remind Hutu 
listeners of this practice and to elicit their fear and repulsion; it did so 
with great success. (Thompson, 2007, p. 44)  
 
The moral superiority frame was also used to dehumanize the ‘other’ 
ethnic group and reversely to show the superiority of their ethnic group. This 
was mostly done by collectively dehumanizing members of the ‘other’ ethnic 
group. Before the genocide the ‘hate’ media of Rwanda used different 
characteristics of evilness which collectively dehumanized Tutsi’s; in this 
regard typically Kangura and RTLM framed Tutsi’s with culturally coded 
dehumanized frames (Ruth, 2014; and Sobel & McIntyre, 2018). Kangura, 
from its inception, its mission was the defense of Hutu interests and it 
published many articles dehumanizing Tutsis (Thompson, 2007, p. 74). The 
typical example of a dehumanizing frame of the Rwanda media basically by 
Kangura and RTLM was labeling Tutsi’s as Inyenzi ‘cockroaches’ (Frohardt 
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& Temin, 2003; James, 2008; Ruth, 2014; and Sobel & McIntyre, 2018). 
Similarly, in 1993 Kangura published an article headlined ‘a cockroach cannot 
give birth to a butterfly’ (Ruth, 2014). This frame was used to dehumanize 
Tutsi’s to the level of pests. This helped to brainwash Hutus into thinking 
‘since a cockroach is something disgusting that should be killed without 
thinking’ (James, 2008; Ruth, 2014; and Straus, 2007). RTLM framed Tutsi’s 
to the extent as ‘Hyena’. ‘On 3 July 1994, Kantano Habimana, the most 
popular journalist, host on RTLM, was still advising his audience to “keep this 
small thing in your heart”, meaning the intent to eradicate the arrogant and 
ferocious “hyenas” ’ (Chrétien, 1995, p. 317).  
Similarly, in Yugoslavia, the moral superiority frame aimed to 
dehumanize the other group was done by ethnic nationalist media. Serbian 
media framed other ethnic groups as ‘Ustashe hordes’, ‘Vatican fascists’, 
‘Mujahidin fighters’, ‘fundamentalist warriors of Jihad’, and ‘Albanian 
terrorists’; these frames quickly became part of a common language (Hannu-
Pekka, 2009). An unverified story aimed to dehumanize the other group was 
presented as fact by Serbia media and become turned into common 
knowledge. For example, as stated by Hannu-Pekka (2009), the media framed 
Bosnian Muslims that: ‘Bosnian Muslims were feeding Serb children to 
animals at the Sarajevo zoo’ (p.23). Because of these stories of Bosnian 
Muslims were framed as lacking human characteristics by their friends and 
neighbors. In the same talk, former Yugoslavia state-based media use different 
frames that dehumanized the ‘other’ group ethnic members collectively; For 
instance, Croatia TV against Serbs, Serbia TV against Croat and other ethnic 
groups (Dinstein, 2001; Malesic, 2013; and Oberschall, 2000). 
The other basic consensus mobilization, media frame which was used 
both in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia was adversarial. In former Yugoslavia, 
Milosevic, Tudjman and other nationalists’ framed long-lasted enemy frame, 
by using media, as: ‘the Serbs are endangered again…. This nation well 
remembers genocide [in World War II]’ (Oberschall, 2000). The adversarial 
frames create fear in the people of Yugoslavia. The basic bullet which poisons 
the inter-ethnic relations of Yugoslavia were ‘fear’; fear of being a victim 
again, fear of loss of life and property, and fear of extinction as a group 
(Oberschall, 2000). After fear was strongly built through different media 
frames; then hate developed. The public was fed exaggerations and total 
fabrications that fit the crisis communicative media frame (Dinstein, 2001; 
Lyon, 2003; and Malesic, 2013). After the collapse of Yugoslavia, the 
nationalist elites were named as the ‘great manipulators’ who spread a ‘culture 
of lies’ (Oberschall, 2000). Creating such kind of antagonistic frame helps the 
nationalist’ politicians to get themselves in the office. Fear and the crisis frame 
provide opportunities for nationalists to mobilize huge ethnic voters, get 
themselves elected to office, and organized, aggressive actions against 
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moderates and other ethnic groups (Hannu-Pekka, 2009; Lyon, 2003; and 
Oberschall, 2000). 
 
Media’s Gravity Frames for Action Mobilization  
Ethnic based media of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia framed 
different gravity frames to create the ‘sense of a clear and present danger’ and 
enemy’s intention to exalt violation. Ethnic based media of both countries 
intensified by framing how the severity of the upcoming situation and how 
circumstances are about to take a dramatic turn even by speaking of worst 
fears which aimed for action mobilization (Oberschall, 2000; and Thompson, 
2007). 
RTLM of Rwanda and Serbia TV and Croatia TV of Yugoslavia 
framed different action mobilization frames. RTLM’s reports continuously 
and in detailed reporting about the assassination of the Burundi president by 
including false triggering contents (Thompson, 2007). Similarly, Serbia TV 
and Croatia TV fabricated and shamelessly transmitted framed victimization 
framed stories repeatedly. For instance, one victims’ video was transmitted 
from Zagreb TV as Serb and Belgrade TV screens transmitted this video as 
Croat (Oberschall, 2000). To the extent, Volčič (2007) names Serbian State 
Television as ‘The Lying Machine’. 
The other media gravity frames aimed to create fear in both countries' 
conflict situations were continuously reporting negative issues about the 
country and overemphasis on certain grievances or inequities. The major 
objective of constant negative reporting of the media was: since the situation 
in the country is becoming terrible, the only option to reverse the country's 
decline is taking radical action including violence. Frohardt and Temin (2003) 
state the media frame goal in the Rwanda situation as “the critical element here 
is change; if the situation has been bad from the start and consistently negative 
reporting is the norm, then it is not likely to be inflammatory” (p.16). All these 
frames used in the media outputs of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia played 
a significant role for ethnic nationalists to mobilize violent action against the 
“other” ethnic groups.  
Discrediting alternative solutions to prevent and manage the conflict 
was another media framing strategy used for the aim of showing the 
inevitability of the violent conflict. The Rwanda media frames the 
inapplicability of ‘Arusha Accords’ by different frames. As stated by 
Oberschall (2000), ethnic nationalist media, like Serbia TV, discredited the 
democracy reform plan of the Yugoslav government as ‘none sense and which 
can’t be implemented; hence the only solution is violence action against our 
“traitors” ’. The above action mobilization, media frames of both Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia were done to create a sense that those windows of opportunity are 
closing; it is ‘now or never’. 
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Enemy ‘within’ frame is one of the gravity frames, framed by the 
media, which created emotions of worst fears in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
cases. During ethnic violence actions and genocides, one of the targets was 
‘in-group’ moderate nationalists because they mostly didn’t accept such 
actions; rather they protect “other’ ethnic groups (Oberschall, 2000; and 
Thompson, 2007). As James (2008) posits that RTLM and Kangura framed 
moderate Hutu nationalists as: ‘the threat of traitors and infiltrators’; in the 
eyes of the ethnic nationalists, those who assisted Tutsi were to be considered 
as if they were Tutsi. As they called them as, ‘moderates could not be trusted 
and when the time came, they too deserved the same fate.’ ‘In extending its 
call against moderates or apathetic people, Hutu nationalist politicians said, 
‘All who try to protect themselves by sympathizing with both sides, they are 
traitors . . . They will pay for what they have done’ (James, 2008, p.97). 
Similarly, this ‘enemy within’ media frame was also framed and 
implemented in action in Yugoslavia’s inter-ethnic conflict. Ethnic 
nationalists of Serbia attack both verbally and in action, not only other ethnic 
groups like Croatian but also the ‘moderate’ Serbs (Oberschall, 2000). Hence, 
the only choice for moderates was to the side towards their ethnic group to 
save their life. Hannu-Pekka (2009) and Lyon (2003) express the impact of 
this frame to the extent that no one wanted the coming war, ‘but if I don’t fight, 
someone from my side will kill me’, and ‘if a friend did not want to fight, the 
others from his/her ethnic group will kill him/her.’ 
 
What is Behind Non-theoretical and Unprofessional Contribution of the 
Media?  
Different researchers try to identify the reasons behind this role of the 
media in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. One of the basic reasons was 
journalists and the media, in general, were hijacked by ethnic nationalists. For 
instance, Borba (independent) newspaper of Bosnia was under severe 
nationalistic bias from 1992 to 2000, and that bias affects the basic principles 
of professionalism (Hannu-Pekka, 2009). RTLM and bimonthly newspaper 
Kangura were the typical Rwanda media hijacked by ethnic nationalist’ 
political elites and wealthy individuals (Chrétien, 1995; Frohardt & Temin, 
2003 and Thompson, 2007) 
Typically Pejic (1998) elaborates how ethnic nationalists forced journalists 
and impacted on media output as follows:  
One of the best journalists from the former Yugoslavia, Slavenka 
DRAKULIC writes in an article: "This is what the war is doing to us - 
reducing us to one dimension. Before, I thought I was defined by my 
education, my job, my ideas, my character, and - yes - my nationality 
too. Now I feel stripped of all of that. I am nobody because I am not 
an individual anymore. I am only one of the 4.5 million Croats (p. 11). 
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On the contrary, those journalists who refused this unethical 
intervention of ethnic nationalists were fired from their job. For instance, Lyon 
(2003) states, the basic victim of these media hijackings was TRUTH; 
‘accompanied by those journalists and editors who refused to surrender to 
nationalist journalism and quickly found themselves unemployed, under 
suspicion, or even under attack’ (p. 221). 
The other problem of journalists and the media was a conflict of 
interest which was manifested in their journalistic output. Different internal 
and external interests come and intertwined in front of journalists of former 
Yugoslavia. According to Pejic (1998), it was manifested between being a 
professional journalist and ethnic journalists; even professional media 
organizations and political parties were also struggling to stand with between 
profession and politics, freedom and control, civic and ethnic community, 
open and closed society and democracy and dictatorship. 
Decentralization of the media, uncontrolled by the central government, 
was also the other problem that gave a chance for ethnic nationalist media to 
trigger inter-ethnic conflicts. This was mostly manifested in the media 
situation in the former Yugoslavia (Kolsto, 2009). Disintegrated and 
nationalistic media outlets, in the name of the confederation, specifically like 
Croatian TV and Serbian TV played the most negative role to disintegrate the 
people based on their ethnic identity and in involving within the conflict. 
 
Ethnic Nationalists Abuse of Media: Current Feature of Ethiopia 
Among ten ethnics based regional state /public owned and six 
commercials (Ethiopia Broadcasting Authority, 2020) television media of the 
country, dominant frames of three state-owned and three commercial media 
which broadcast their respective ethnic group issues were analyzed in this part 
of the study. Oromo Broadcasting Network (OBN), Amhara TV, and Tigray 
TV are regional state/ public owned (ethnic-based) media from Oromo, 
Amhara, and Tigre ethnic groups respectively selected and used in this 
analysis. Oromo Media Network (OMN), Amhara Satellite Radio and 
Television (ASRAT TV), and Dimiti Woyane Tigray Television (DW TV) are 
commercial media from Oromo, Amhara, and Tigre ethnic groups respectively 
selected for this analysis. 
 
‘Ethnic Injustice’ and ‘Victimization’ Frames: Dominate Frames of Ethnic 
Based Media  
‘Ethnic injustice’ and ‘victimization’ frames are the dominant ethnic-
based media frame in current Ethiopia; which has the power to create a sense 
of fear, shows the severity of the current and the upcoming situation. Unlike 
other frames, this frame almost equally framed by Amhara, Oromo, and Tigre 
ethnic nationalist media. These media used these frames by associating with 
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long-lasting historical ethnic injustice and victimization of one ethnic group 
with the other; by manipulating myth and history. They also associate these 
‘historical’ frames with the current ‘ethnic injustice’ and ‘victimization’ 
frames to create a sense of fear of being victimized again.  
As of myth of pre-colonial times, Tutsi kings claimed to castrate the defeated 
enemies and decorated their royal drums with the genitalia; there is a similar 
myth of Ethiopia’s king Menilik II castration and cutting off women’s breast. 
There are contradicting historical writing and unproved history on the 
wrongdoings of Menilik II, but ethnic-based media specifically from ‘Oromo’ 
and ‘Tigre’ tried to frame this myth with the current political as well as social 
relations of ‘Amhara’ ethnic group. Oromo ethnic nationalists framed Menilik 
II, Emperor Haile Selassie, and other former leaders as colonizers. For 
instance, OMN framed Menilik II as ‘settled colonizer who did the genocide 
to Oromo ethnic groups and they have such kinds of historical pains’. On the 
contrary, Amhara TV and ASRAT TV framed Menilik II as ‘hero’ of the 
country (Amhara TV, 2019c; and ASRAT TV, 2019a).  
Amhara TV and ASRAT TV mostly framed the last 29 years, which 
was dominantly led by ‘TPLF’, politically and economically as a period of 
structural ethnic injustice and victimizing Amhara (ASRAT TV, 2019c; and 
ASRAT TV, 2019d). Similarly, OMN and OBN mostly focus on frames that 
target the Amhara people by framing them as ‘former rulers of the country’; 
they attached them with dehumanizing, victimizing, and making ethnic 
injustice on the Oromo people for hundreds of years. Tigray TV and DW 
framed the Amhara people as the same as OMN and OBN by continually 
selecting and emphasizing on unjustified stories. Such kinds of debatable 
‘historical’ myth dependent crisis frames are framed and politically 
communicated in the country through the media. 
These media institutions also framed that, currently we are becoming 
victimized and facing ethnic injustice as part of the extension of the previous 
historical similar pains. For instance, Amhara ethnic group based media 
framed the current Oromo political elite activities as ‘a group of people who 
wants to victimize Amhara people by using recent government led by Abiy 
Ahmed as an advantage’ (ASRAT TV, 2019c). On the contrary Oromo ethnic 
group based media frame Amhara as ‘chauvinists’, ‘anti-federalists’, and a 
people who struggle to retrieve the former ‘feudal’ rulers to oppress the Oromo 
people (OMN, 2019a; and OMN, 2019b;). Tigray ethnic group based media 
also framed the current government as ‘feudal cliques’ who targeted to 
victimize the Tigray people (Tigray TV, 2019a). Amhara TV and ASRAT TV 
framed that, currently, there is Oromo dominancy in the federal government 
and Adiss Ababa city administration (Amhara TV, 2019d). On the contrary, 
OBN and OMN framed that, still there is no equality in political positions, for 
instance, only 17% of federal civil servants are from Oromo and almost all 
European Scientific Journal June 2020 edition Vol.16, No.16 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
111 
palace members are from Amhara, except the PM; if this is not solved, we 
cannot guarantee peace in this country. On the other side, Tigray TV and DW 
framed that: Tigreans are pushed out from the federal government only 
because of their identity. 
Unfortunately, such kinds of victimization and injustices ‘crisis’ 
frames of the media, which will instigate inter-ethnic conflicts in the country 
are framed by using higher government officials, including presidents of the 
regional states and regional ethnic-based ruling parties public speeches as 
sources of the news. The typical example was the public speech of Oromia 
region president Shimelis Abdissa during ‘Irreecha’ cultural ceremony, on 
October 6, 2019, held in Adiss Ababa central Meskel Square. He said:  
We Oromo’s were parallelized in this place by “Neftegna’ (a 
stereotypical name to label Amhara ethnic group), the “dehumanizing” 
of our Oromos was started here, like Tufa Muna and other heroes of 
Oromo were attacked here by “Neftegna”….BUT NOW we Oromo’s 
becomes respected in the place where we dehumanized, by 
parallelizing and dislocating them. Congratulations for our WIN’ 
(OBN, 2019b). 
 
Since this speech is done after the coming of prime minister 
from‘Oromo’ ethnic group and they celebrate the Oromo’s people cultural 
ceremony of ‘Irreecha’ in capital city Adiss Ababa (Many Oromo leaders 
argue that Addis Ababa is part of their homeland) after 150 years, the first time 
after Minilik II; he framed that we defeated our enemy ‘Amhara’.  
Such kinds of media frames are also sourced from the ruling ethnic 
parties of the country. TPLF and ADM/ANDM parties’ press releases make 
contents of their message following the assassination of higher officials of the 
Amhara region and military chief of the country (From Tigre ethnic group) is 
another example of victimization and injustices ‘crisis’ frames which will be 
used to instigate inter-ethnic conflicts between Amhara and Tigray ethnic 
groups. TPLF by its triggering press release blames and frames the 
responsibility of all the crisis of the country, including the assassination of the 
higher officials of the country, is because of ‘chauvinists’ supported by ADP 
(Tigray TV, 2019b; and DW TV, 2019c). TPLF press release was seemed as 
counter political communication, attacking against ADP because of recent 
political disagreements and mainly aimed to trigger the people for 
destabilizing the peace and security of the region. On the other hand, 
ADP/ANDM’s counter-press release for the response of the TPLF press 
release focuses on counter-frames on ‘TPLF’s long lasting historical and 
current enemy of Amhara people, they are doing injustice and victimizing of 
the Amhara people’. ADP on its counter press release frames TPLF as ‘a 
historical enemy of the Amhara people’ by using different triggering words 
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and expressions which may increase the victimization mentality of the Amhara 
people (Amhara TV, 2019h). 
What was strongly framed by the media, as a deep-rooted victimization 
frame, by nationalist elites in all corners of Ethiopia is that ‘they are 
settlers/strangers and to the extent as colonizers’; similar to Rwanda’s 
situation before the genocide. This frame has become consistently increasing 
in the last two years; in these years the violent conflict between different ethnic 
groups becomes increasing and complicating. ‘Son of the soil’ frame, a 
potential cause of alienation and violence (Taddele, 2017), is another long-
lasted media frame framed as a counter-frame in current Ethiopia. Amhara and 
Oromo ethnic nationalists from each other as a counter-frame on the issue of 
the Adiss Ababa city; by using their respective ethnic-based media. For 
instance, Oromo nationalists framed other ethnic groups of the country, more 
specifically Amhara as ‘settlers’ of Addis Ababa. On the contrary, Amhara 
nationalists framed ‘Oromo’ as ‘strangers’ for the Addis Ababa city. This is 
all about ‘Settlers’ vs. ‘Strangers’ as ‘Son of the soil’ counters frame 
competition of Amhara and Oromo extreme ethnic nationalists by using the 
media. Such kind of frames creates a fertile condition for extreme ethnic 
nationalists to create a sense of mistrust and hostility between Amhara and 
Oromo. 
Antihero frames are the other adversarial frame, framed by ethnic-
based media of Amhara, Oromo, and Tigre ethnic groups. The Amhara ethnic 
group based media framed king Minilik II as ‘a father of modern Ethiopia’ 
(Amhara TV, 2018b); whereas the Oromo and Tigre ethnic group based media 
framed him in an anti-hero frame as ‘colonizer’, ‘oppressor’, ‘killer’ and the 
like (Tigray TV, 2019). Similarly, Melese Zenawi (former Prime minister of 
the country) is framed by the Tigre ethnic group based media as a man who 
struggles for the equality of nations and nationalities of Ethiopia, and 
mastermind of the economic development of the country; On the contrary, 
Amhara and Oromo ethnic group based media framed him in an anti-hero 
frame as the sole responsible person for the overall crisis and who brought all 
the evil things of the country. Jawar Mohammed, a well-known Oromo 
nationalist, is framed by Oromo ethnic group based media as ‘mobilizer, the 
voice for voiceless of the country (Oromo) and calculator of the recent 
political reform of the country’ (OMN, 2019d); whereas Amhara ethnic group 
based media framed him in an anti-hero frame as ‘terrorist and the cause for 
the current crisis of the country’ (ASRAT TV, 2019e). Such kinds of ‘hero 
and anti-hero’ frames are one of the major causes which increase a sense of 
hostility and enmity between these ethnic groups of the country. 
There are adversarial media frames, by ethnic-based media of 
Ethiopia, which possibly will create mistrust, enmity, even hatred, grievances, 
and polarized perceptions. As of ‘Inyenzi’ (cockroaches) and ‘Hyena’ in 
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Rwanda and ‘fundamentalist warriors of Jihad’ in former Yugoslavia; ethnic-
based media of Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups frequently framed the Prime 
Minister Abiy Ahmed speech about TPLF. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in 
his first days of office, framed Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) as “a 
day Hyena” (in Amharic “የቀን ጅብ”) (Abiy, 2018). This was a frame that may 
create mistrust, grievances, and polarized perceptions between Tigre and other 
ethnic groups of the country.  
 
Ethnic Based Media’s Gravity Frames in Current Ethiopia 
Similar to both Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, current ethnic-based 
media of Ethiopia framed different kinds of communicative gravity frames 
which aimed to create the ‘sense of a clear and present danger’, enemy’s 
intention to exact violations or attack their ethnic group. The severity of the 
upcoming situation and frame circumstances are about to take a dramatic turn 
even by speaking of worst fears. 
Amhara TV and ASRAT TV frequently framed ‘Tigre’ ethnic group 
in the name of TPLF as torturers, corrupters, who made intensive genocide on 
‘Amhara’ people (ASRAT TV, 2019c); Likewise, they framed ‘Oromo’ ethnic 
group members as ‘contemporary treats’ of the Amhara people and an ethnic 
group to be dominant figures of the country, in the sense of ‘it is our turn’ 
(ASRAT TV, 2019c). For instance, ASRAT TV framed the current political 
activities of Oromo ethnic group, by interviewing a well-known Amhara 
ethnic nationalist, that: ‘we will face severe consequences even more than the 
last 28 years; our (Amhara’s) near future will face attacks from ‘this time’ 
leaders (Oromo’s)’ (ASRAT TV, 2019c). Similarly, ethnic-based media of the 
Oromo ethnic group framed the current ethnic nationalist movement of 
‘Amhara’ as: ‘extreme nationalist propaganda which is anti-federalist, warrior 
nationalist and eager to break out conflict with other regions and which is 
similar with Serbian nationalist’ (OMN, 2019a; and OMN, 2019b). 
Similarly, Amhara TV framed speech of the Amhara regional peace 
and security chief in a special security force graduation program, transmitted 
by Amhara TV, ‘before 500 years we face the same victimization history; but 
the current victimizing act and the threat of ‘us’ is more severe than before. 
So our people and especially you the special security force have to be ready 
for this…’ (Amhara TV, 2019e). Similarly, in a public discussion with Bahir 
Dar town they framed this security chief speech as: ‘every effort was made to 
demolish Amhara as a person; … and currently, our threat is more feasible… 
we have to be organized…our elders and religious leaders after now don’t talk 
about a peaceful resolution of the problems’ (Amhara TV, 2019f). These 
frames of Asamenew’s speech were trying to create a ‘sense of a clear and 
present danger’ and enemy’s intention (more specifically from the ‘Oromo’ 
ethnic group) to exact violations. A few months after these public speeches, 
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Amhara regional peace and security chief, General Asaminew Tsige, got killed 
in rural place; and the government claimed him for the assassination of three 
Amhara regional state higher officials including the President of the regional 
state (Amhara TV, 2019g). 
On the other side, Tigray regional state president, Debretsion 
Gebremichael, on his public speech in a rally against the current federal 
government in Tigray international stadium framed the current government as 
‘feudal cliques’ and ‘residuals of the former government’; live transmitted by 
Tigray TV (Tigray TV, 2018a; and Tigray TV, 2018b). He also said that ‘we 
Tegaru’s are endangered; we are encircled by different enemies from different 
directions….. But as of before 28 years, we can and have to challenge this 
group….we have to be ready’ (Tigray TV, 2018a; and Tigray TV, 2018b). 
Debretsion Gebremichael, as of ‘Serbia’s Milosevic’, and his party TPLF 
pushed out from central government in public struggle and internal party 
struggle. Thus, they used this frame to mobilize their people to ‘hide them’ 
and also targeted to instigate conflict between Amhara and Oromo by labeling 
PM Dr. Abiy (from Oromo) as ‘feudal cliques’ and ‘residuals of the former 
government’, that means he is not acting like Oromo rather as Amhara (Tigray 
TV, 2019). 
The Amhara TV, the OBN, and the Tigray TV show mass regional 
security forces training, graduations, and military show on public gathering 
places (Amhara TV, 2019b; OBN, 2019a; and Tigray TV, 2020). These were 
framed to create the ‘sense of a clear and present danger’ and enemy’s 
intention to intensify violation. These media framed the government officials’ 
speeches on these programs as ‘we are endangered and encircled; hence we 
are strengthening our force, and if anybody tries to harm us, we will punish…’ 
Such kinds of gravity frames led both Yugoslavia and Rwanda to violent 
actions between different ethnic groups. 
These media institutions also frame gravity frames basically to 
mobilize their ethnic group by framing as ‘our ethnic group members who are 
living outside our regional states are killed and massacred by other ethnic 
groups’, and to frame ‘the regions are out of the rule of law’. Oromia and 
Tigray region-based media institutions frame conflicts and civilian attacks that 
were occurring in the Amhara region with similar framing themes of ‘Amhara 
ethnic groups are still doing mass killings and genocide of minority ethnic 
groups as their former fathers did it in the country’. The issue of the Gumuze 
ethnic group killing in the Jawi woreda (Amhara regional state) (OMN, 
2019a); the inter-ethnic conflict between Qimant and Amhara (OMN, 2019b; 
DW TV, 2019b; and Tigray TV, 2019); and the inter-ethnic conflict of Amhara 
and Oromo in the Oromia zone of the Amhara region (OMN, 2019c) are the 
typical frames. Even OMN and DW frame Gumuze and Qimant cases as 
‘genocide’ without considering and balancing the issue, not confirmed by a 
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responsible organization, and even reported it without sending reporters on the 
spot (DW TV, 2019a; and OMN, 2019b).  
Similar to the prior major frame of ‘our brothers and sisters are already 
killed and massacred abroad…’, Amhara TV and ASRAT TV select and frame 
conflict and civilian attacks which were mostly occurred in the Oromia region 
and Tigray regions by the framing angle of ‘Amhara are victimized and 
attacked selectively outside the region’. For instance, they select and 
emphasize killings in the Burayu town of Oromia region, conflicts and mass 
killings in most Oromia region cities (ASRAT TV, 2019b), killings, and 
human rights violations of ‘Raya’ and ‘Welqite’ people in Tigray region 
(Amhara TV, 2019a).  
Like the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda nationalists, the current 
ethnic nationalists of Ethiopia are using ‘Enemy within’ frames through their 
ethnic-based media. Ethnic nationalists mostly from Amhara, Oromo, and 
Tigre framed them ‘in-group’ moderate nationalists and a group of elites who 
don’t believe in “ethnic politics’ as ‘traitors and infiltrators’. The common 
communicative ‘enemy within frames’ in current Ethiopia is ‘Renegade’ (in 
Amharic ‘Banda’). For instance, Tigre Ethnic nationalists framed moderate 
Tigre nationalists as ‘paid by the current government’ and who tried to give 
Tigrians’ interest to their enemy (Feudal clique PM Abiy). On the other hand, 
the current number one ‘enemy within’ for most Oromo ethnic nationalists is 
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. They framed the Prime minister as ‘Anti Oromo 
feudal clique’, ‘he is led by Amhara chauvinists and ‘Neftegnas’ and a person 
stands against Oromo interests (Jawar, 2019; and Tsegay, 2019). 
Generally, these ethnic-based media select and frame agendas of 
‘extreme’ ethnic nationalists by selecting and emphasizing ‘crisis’ frames; 
which aimed to mobilize their ethnic group for consensus and action for the 
sake of their political motive. They select and frame ‘in-group’ victimization, 
ethnic injustice, and gravity frames. 
 
Conclusions and Major Lessons 
Conclusion 
Yugoslavia and the 1994 Rwanda media played the role of instigating 
and flaring inter-ethnic conflict and genocide. Different research findings 
agreed that the media has a significant impact on the out breaking and 
widening of the conflict in both countries. Different researchers express the 
powerful negative role of the media in the inter-ethnic conflict in former 
Yugoslavia and the 1994 Rwanda genocide as Abuse of media, Words of War, 
Prime Time Crime, Propaganda Machine, The Lying Machine and Blaming 
the Media.  
Similarly, the current manifestations and trends of Ethiopia's ethnic-
based media are following the path of these countries. Regional state/public 
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media and specific ‘ethnic’ group based private Ethiopian media are abused 
by ‘extreme ethnic nationalists’. They are playing their negative role by 
selecting and emphasizing victimization and ethnic injustice frames; which 
has the power to mobilize ‘in-group’ consensus for preferring violent action 
against the ‘out-group’. There are also manifestations of violent action 
mobilization, media frames. Ethnic based mainstream media, both state and 
private, is the sole channel of communication for crisis frames of extreme 
ethnic nationalists. However, the direct role of these ethnic-based media for 
the current inter-ethnic conflict of Ethiopia demands further study.  
 
Lessons of Yugoslavia and Rwanda for Ethiopia 
When State Media Abused by “extreme Ethnic Nationalists” 
During inter-ethnic tension and conflict, the people perceive their 
respective state/public media as a main source of information. Hence, the 
impact of state/public media to instigate inter-ethnic tensions are higher than 
commercial media. Both countries’ cases confirm this role. State/public media 
of the country should stop the role of serving as an ‘envelope’ for extreme 
ethnic nationalists. 
 
The Political Economy of the Media  
Media is the manifestation of the political economy of the country. We 
can’t blame journalists totally and even we can’t blame the media in general; 
because they are the reflection of the political economy of the country. The 
former Yugoslavia and the 1994 Rwanda instigating and flaring role of the 
media was the result of the Political economy of the media. Thus we can’t 
blame OMN, OBN, Amhara TV, ASRAT TV, Tigray TV, DW, and others. 
But these are the reflections or manifestations of the political decay of Oromia, 
Amhara, and Tigray regions in specifically and generally as one of the result 
of the decay of the country’s political economy. 
 
Decentralization of the Media - in the Name of the Federation Will Cost a Lot 
Decentralization of the media, uncontrolled by the central government, 
was also the other problem that gave a chance for ethnic nationalist media to 
trigger inter-ethnic conflicts. This was mostly manifested in the media 
situation in the former Yugoslavia. Disintegrated and nationalistic media 
outlets, in the name of the confederation, specifically like Croatian TV and 
Serbian TV played the most negative role of the media to disintegrate the 
people based on their ethnic identity and involved in the conflict. Hence, 
Ethiopia as a country needs to reconsider the media law related to ownership, 
source of finance, and mandate.  
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Ethnic Based Media in the Age of Social Media: ‘Bullet’ of ‘Extreme Ethnic 
Nationalists’ 
Yugoslavia was demolished and had faced the worst genocide, 
Rwanda, in the history of the world was fastened by mainstream media; there 
were no social media. It is silly to compare the negative role and impact of 
social media and mainstream media for inter-ethnic conflicts. Ethiopia faces 
this problem in the age of social media; which is uncontrolled media. 
Hence,unless the scenario is changed, the probability of facing Yugoslavia’s 
and Rwanda’s incidents will be feasible even faster than these countries. 
 
Proactive Interventions on Ethnic Based Media Needed  
Taking appropriate interventions on media in response to the clues for 
conflict is the major lesson which should learn from Rwanda and Yugoslavia. 
Economically poor and developing societies; and struggling to move from 
dictatorship to establish democratic foundations are particularly made them 
vulnerable to genocide (Thompson, 2007). Journalists in such societies are 
frequently manipulated and corrupted by the dominant political group, hence 
they become considered as ‘envelope journalists’; And their stories are based 
on stereotyping and sensationalism for the themes of their news stories and are 
forced to become ignorant of potential news stories which would help to 
diminish the ethnic and political hatred (Frohardt and Temin, 2003). Structural 
or early-stage interventions and aggressive or middle-stage intervention needs 
to be implemented in Ethiopia before the time is gone; late-stage intervention 
will cost a lot. 
Generally, Ethiopia should learn these major lessons from Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda; and it is the right time to take appropriate and proactive 
measures. Besides all the above fact structural, content-specific, and 
aggressive, proactive interventions in the media are highly needed. Otherwise, 
the probability of the country to follow the wrong roads of the former 
Yugoslavia and the 1994 Rwanda will be feasible. 
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